Arkady
President
You'll sometimes hear it said that the US has unusually high corporate tax rates. But you'll also hear it said that it has unusually low corporate tax rates. Both are true depending on what you're talking about. Our statutory top corporate tax rate is, in fact, quite high -- higher than any other developed nation. Yet our effective corporate tax rate (the rate corporations actually pay), is below the average for developed countries.
If you treated all the OECD nations besides the US as if they were one big country, and measured the effective corporate tax rate for that country,it would be 27.7%, versus 27.1% for the US (2008 numbers -- the most recent I found). Another way of measuring the same thing would be to see what total corporate income tax receipts in each country were, relative to GDP. In the US (as of 2010), they were 1.3% (or 1.6% if you include state corporate income taxes). The OECD ex-US average is 2.8%. So, we're collecting about half as much tax revenue from corporations as is normal for a developed nation.
You could look at this and think "well, if US corporations are already paying unusually little in taxes, there's no need to reform corporate taxes in this country, unless it be to raise rates." But it's not that simple. Because of our high nominal rates and our gigantic loopholes, there are enormous differences in the effective rates paid from one company to the next. Even though the US has an attractive corporate tax climate, by developed-nation standards, on average, it's very unattractive for businesses that can't make use of many loopholes. Thus, even with effective rates being below average, we'll still drive away the businesses that have much higher effective rates than they could get elsewhere.
The solution to this would be a combination of lowering nominal rates and closing loopholes, in such a way that average effective rates would stay steady (or maybe even rise), but the variability from one company to the next would diminish. This would also save companies money in terms of the labor costs and the distortions in their activities attributable to tax avoidance.
This is the kind of thing that Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives, should be able to cooperate on, even in this era of gridlock. It's a win-win. It will lower costs for the taxpayer (the simpler the code, the less work to enforce it), lower costs for the businesses, and diminish any incentive for corporations to flee the country, while bringing in the same revenues. And I'm sure there are plenty of technocrats with no partisan axe to grind who can come up with fairly uncontroversial means for closing loopholes.
Here's an idea for making it happen:
Pass a law that causes the nominal corporate tax rate to automatically adjust upward or downward, each year, by the amount that average corporate tax receipts over the last three years overshot or undershot a given target. So, let's say your target is that corporate income tax receipts should be 2% of GDP (well under the OECD average, even after adding state taxes on top of that). If actual receipts over the three year period were 2.5%, and the nominal rate was 40%, then the nominal rate would automatically adjust down to 32% (which would be projected to reduce the collections from 2.5% of GDP to the 2% of GDP that is targeted).
You could set up a commission, staffed with tax experts from a broad swath of corporations, that would propose the loopholes to eliminate and other reforms to put in place, with Congress being limited to up-or-down votes on the recommendations. Each time a loophole closed, it would tend to push tax revenues up, which would force the nominal rate to adjust downward, dropping the effective tax rate paid by the companies that don't have access to many loopholes. Over time, then tendency would be to weed out nearly all loopholes, to allow for the lowest possible nominal rate, and the corporations themselves would do the work of identifying the reforms, since every company would have an incentive to target for destruction any loophole it doesn't actually use. Attempts by a minority of corporations to add loopholes through the process would be shot down by the majority of corporations, since those new loopholes would have the effect of driving up nominal rates and thus the tax liability of any company that can't use that loophole.
That would leave in place loopholes that benefit the majority of corporations more than a commensurately lower nominal rate would, but would systematically target the breaks that are worse for the majority than a commensurate nominal rate cut would be.
More information:
http://ctj.org/ctjreports/2013/04/b...y_low_corporate_income_taxes.php#.VZQ8YkZffYM
If you treated all the OECD nations besides the US as if they were one big country, and measured the effective corporate tax rate for that country,it would be 27.7%, versus 27.1% for the US (2008 numbers -- the most recent I found). Another way of measuring the same thing would be to see what total corporate income tax receipts in each country were, relative to GDP. In the US (as of 2010), they were 1.3% (or 1.6% if you include state corporate income taxes). The OECD ex-US average is 2.8%. So, we're collecting about half as much tax revenue from corporations as is normal for a developed nation.
You could look at this and think "well, if US corporations are already paying unusually little in taxes, there's no need to reform corporate taxes in this country, unless it be to raise rates." But it's not that simple. Because of our high nominal rates and our gigantic loopholes, there are enormous differences in the effective rates paid from one company to the next. Even though the US has an attractive corporate tax climate, by developed-nation standards, on average, it's very unattractive for businesses that can't make use of many loopholes. Thus, even with effective rates being below average, we'll still drive away the businesses that have much higher effective rates than they could get elsewhere.
The solution to this would be a combination of lowering nominal rates and closing loopholes, in such a way that average effective rates would stay steady (or maybe even rise), but the variability from one company to the next would diminish. This would also save companies money in terms of the labor costs and the distortions in their activities attributable to tax avoidance.
This is the kind of thing that Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives, should be able to cooperate on, even in this era of gridlock. It's a win-win. It will lower costs for the taxpayer (the simpler the code, the less work to enforce it), lower costs for the businesses, and diminish any incentive for corporations to flee the country, while bringing in the same revenues. And I'm sure there are plenty of technocrats with no partisan axe to grind who can come up with fairly uncontroversial means for closing loopholes.
Here's an idea for making it happen:
Pass a law that causes the nominal corporate tax rate to automatically adjust upward or downward, each year, by the amount that average corporate tax receipts over the last three years overshot or undershot a given target. So, let's say your target is that corporate income tax receipts should be 2% of GDP (well under the OECD average, even after adding state taxes on top of that). If actual receipts over the three year period were 2.5%, and the nominal rate was 40%, then the nominal rate would automatically adjust down to 32% (which would be projected to reduce the collections from 2.5% of GDP to the 2% of GDP that is targeted).
You could set up a commission, staffed with tax experts from a broad swath of corporations, that would propose the loopholes to eliminate and other reforms to put in place, with Congress being limited to up-or-down votes on the recommendations. Each time a loophole closed, it would tend to push tax revenues up, which would force the nominal rate to adjust downward, dropping the effective tax rate paid by the companies that don't have access to many loopholes. Over time, then tendency would be to weed out nearly all loopholes, to allow for the lowest possible nominal rate, and the corporations themselves would do the work of identifying the reforms, since every company would have an incentive to target for destruction any loophole it doesn't actually use. Attempts by a minority of corporations to add loopholes through the process would be shot down by the majority of corporations, since those new loopholes would have the effect of driving up nominal rates and thus the tax liability of any company that can't use that loophole.
That would leave in place loopholes that benefit the majority of corporations more than a commensurately lower nominal rate would, but would systematically target the breaks that are worse for the majority than a commensurate nominal rate cut would be.
More information:
http://ctj.org/ctjreports/2013/04/b...y_low_corporate_income_taxes.php#.VZQ8YkZffYM