Arkady
President
I've just started reading Thomas Piketty's blockbuster economics tome "Capital in the 21st Century." It's 700 pages, and I'm only about 50 pages in, but so far it's been great.
His theses aren't terribly revolutionary. They're things I tumbled to, without any formal macroeconomic education, years ago. And I'm sure many here already understood them instinctively. Among those:
(1) Wealth tends to "trickle up" over time, other than in extraordinary periods that disrupt the normal flow (such as the period encompassing WWI, the Great Depression, and WWII).
(2) If the rate of return on capital exceeds the growth rate of the economy, national wealth will tend to collect in the hands of the few.
(3) The value of labor, relative to capital, tends to decline in periods of low economic growth (which also emphasizes the relative importance of inheritance rather than personal production).
(4) These are not automatic features of the market, but rather respond to various policy choices that countries make (some of which are responsible for the reversal in the rise of income inequality we see in the extraordinary periods like 1914-1945).
Although none of those should be very striking, it sounds like what Piketty has set his sites on is incredibly ambitious: rather than using raw theoretical constructs and math (and naked political ideology) to establish these things, he's going to use massive amounts of historical data, spanning dozens of countries and going back centuries... some of which had to be generated fresh from sources like old tax assessments, from eras when nations didn't track national stats, but did collect data that would be useful for discovering them.
One other point he made (in justifying how much he focuses on France rather than the US in some of his assessments) is a good one to keep in mind. When projecting forward how capital and wealth are likely to play out in the 21s century, the history of the US is probably a poor example. After all, over the course of 230 years, the US expanded its physical territory to nine times its original size, and expanded its population to over ten times the original size. That kind of population growth rate is unlikely for the world, as a whole, in coming centuries, and such physical growth rate is impossible. So, France, which in the same era only doubled in population and kept roughly the same land area winds up being a better model for long-term changes in wealth distribution. The kinds of things the US used to do that promoted wealth equality in the past, like giving away huge tracts of arable farmland to landless citizens, is not something that can happen on a global scale going forward. If you're worried about excessive inequality, you'll need to look to other policy options to address it.
His theses aren't terribly revolutionary. They're things I tumbled to, without any formal macroeconomic education, years ago. And I'm sure many here already understood them instinctively. Among those:
(1) Wealth tends to "trickle up" over time, other than in extraordinary periods that disrupt the normal flow (such as the period encompassing WWI, the Great Depression, and WWII).
(2) If the rate of return on capital exceeds the growth rate of the economy, national wealth will tend to collect in the hands of the few.
(3) The value of labor, relative to capital, tends to decline in periods of low economic growth (which also emphasizes the relative importance of inheritance rather than personal production).
(4) These are not automatic features of the market, but rather respond to various policy choices that countries make (some of which are responsible for the reversal in the rise of income inequality we see in the extraordinary periods like 1914-1945).
Although none of those should be very striking, it sounds like what Piketty has set his sites on is incredibly ambitious: rather than using raw theoretical constructs and math (and naked political ideology) to establish these things, he's going to use massive amounts of historical data, spanning dozens of countries and going back centuries... some of which had to be generated fresh from sources like old tax assessments, from eras when nations didn't track national stats, but did collect data that would be useful for discovering them.
One other point he made (in justifying how much he focuses on France rather than the US in some of his assessments) is a good one to keep in mind. When projecting forward how capital and wealth are likely to play out in the 21s century, the history of the US is probably a poor example. After all, over the course of 230 years, the US expanded its physical territory to nine times its original size, and expanded its population to over ten times the original size. That kind of population growth rate is unlikely for the world, as a whole, in coming centuries, and such physical growth rate is impossible. So, France, which in the same era only doubled in population and kept roughly the same land area winds up being a better model for long-term changes in wealth distribution. The kinds of things the US used to do that promoted wealth equality in the past, like giving away huge tracts of arable farmland to landless citizens, is not something that can happen on a global scale going forward. If you're worried about excessive inequality, you'll need to look to other policy options to address it.